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I. Introduction 
The developing world has implemented many different policies to catch up with the 
educational outcomes observed in the more advanced countries. In the past, policies were 
usually based on the premise that increasing the spending on education inputs would improve 
educational attainment. However, the link between spending on school inputs and student 
performance does not seem strong enough to account for the gap between the developing 
world and OECD countries. Therefore, in recent years considerable attention has been given 
to school management. Thus, this chapter explores the literature on interventions that focus 
on the way in which resources are managed, instead of focusing on the amount of resources 
used. 
We define School Management as the system through which schools are organized 
to manage their resources. It includes three main branches: the school market (whether 
schools are public or private, and the regulation of competition in the schooling system), the 
administration of schools (whether the system is centralized or there is a school-based 
management of power, knowledge and budget) and the school organization (involving the 
curriculum, class-size, tracking of students, incentives and contracts to teachers, among 
others). 
In this chapter we review the empirical literature on three different aspects of School 
Management. Firstly, we address the effect of school decentralization on educational 
outcomes (Section III). Secondly, we analyze topics related to the tracking of students within 
schools (Section IV) and thirdly, we explore the effect of different teacher incentive schemes, 
including pay for performance and contract teachers (Section V). The topics studied are 
timely given the recently adopted reforms in these areas. Recent experience with these 
reforms provides a body of evidence which can be used to reach some conclusions regarding 
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their effectiveness. By no means is our list exhaustive. In fact, in this volume there are 
interesting analyses of other relevant issues that fall under our broad definition of School 
Management, such as school competition (Chapter 7) and topics related to incentives for 
parents and students (sections 3 and 4 in Chapter 5). Lastly, we do not cover other important 
issues, such as curriculum design, for which the evidence is still limited. 
The aim of this Chapter is to introduce the big questions regarding school 
decentralization, tracking of students and teacher incentives, as well as to explore the main 
trade-offs implied in the policies targeted at those aspects of School Management. There is 
controversy about the efficacy of these policies and the way they should be applied under 
different contexts. For example, economists and some policy-makers seem to be sympathetic 
to decentralization measures, but there is no consensus about the potential benefits of tracking 
and contract teachers. Furthermore, while reforms involving school decentralization and 
teacher incentives have been relatively widespread during the last decade in the developing 
world, tracking has lacked similar popularity. 
Regarding the methodological approach adopted in this chapter, we focus especially 
on the empirical evidence in each topic. Firstly, we provide a simple theoretical framework to 
illustrate the main potential gains and sources of trade-offs. With the framework in mind, we 
construct a large – though non-exhaustive – review of empirical papers that study the topic at 
hand. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to understand the causal effect of these types of 
interventions on educational performance. Therefore, identification issues are of first order 
importance. In the review we mainly include papers that exploit experimental or quasi-
experimental identification strategies. Those methods have proven to be the most accurate in 
reconstructing the counterfactual needed to study the fundamental problem of causal 
inference. Nevertheless, we also include important cross-sectional studies of correlations 
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between variables of interest, but we always make clear the potential sources and direction of 
possible bias in the non-experimental estimates. 
Another methodological concern that is important for understanding the message we 
want to transmit concerns the comparison across results that comes from different types of 
studies. For example, in the tracking section we report observational or quasi-experimental 
studies that find no (or even a negative) effect of this intervention on students’ performance, 
while we also review randomized experiments showing a positive impact of tracking. The 
way in which we should reconcile the results is to understand the heterogeneity of both the 
settings and the methods exploited. Unfortunately, for the time being, different settings are 
studied with different methodologies, so it is not obvious whether the differences in findings 
across studies are due only to differences in methodology or also to differences in the true 
parameters across the different settings. Nevertheless, a priori, we rely more on the results 
reported in experimental studies due to their higher credibility in identifying the causal 
effects of the interventions. 
The last methodological issue we want to emphasize is closely related to the previous 
one. Even though experimental studies are internally valid, they do not necessarily have 
external validity (an issue obviously not exclusive to experimental studies, though). 
Therefore, the results cannot be generalized without further assumptions. Furthermore, 
external validity issues are somewhat more pressing when the effects of the interventions are 
heterogeneous across populations. For example, we show that in the case of tracking the 
effects of this intervention are highly dependent on the distribution of students’ performance. 
Essentially, it is important to know whether the distribution is bimodal or uni-modal. 
Assumptions regarding this distribution will be needed to extend the experimental results 
from one setting to other settings: e.g., the distribution of students is probably very different 
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in the US and Kenya.1 This fact, of course, does not diminish at all the importance of a study 
conducted under particular conditions. What it is more, we are often specifically interested in 
understanding how a policy or intervention works in a specific context.  
Our main findings regarding the three School Management interventions studied in 
this chapter are the following. Decentralization programs seem to be successful in increasing 
the average performance of students. However, the better-off communities or schools tend to 
profit more from this intervention; thus future studies should attempt to understand how 
school autonomy affects poor and wealthy communities differently. Regarding tracking, the 
experimental evidence is still scarce, but it seems, at least in the context of a poor country 
where student performance is highly heterogeneous, that tracking increases the performance 
of all students. Finally, the results of teacher incentives interventions are generally positive, 
though the precise design of the compensation scheme is key for producing long-lasting 
improvements in learning. Also, in very poor countries, contract teachers have positive 
results in reducing absenteeism of teachers and improving the performance of students. 
However, understanding whether these results can be attributed to incentives, decentralization 
of hiring decisions or other mechanisms is essential to improving contract design for tenured 
civil service teachers and to better benefit from the combination of the two types of teachers. 
Finally, we would like to point out that in most of the studies reviewed – as in the 
majority of impact evaluation papers – the focus is on the average treatment effect on the 
                                                 
1 There is also the concern that the results are not robust when the experiment is scaled-up. When the policies 
are applied outside the controlled experiment, the behaviors of the agents may change, altering the effects 
previously identified. For instance, in the tracking experiments – as we review later – the allocation of teachers 
to sections is random, while in a non-experimental setup there might be sorting of teachers (see Pop-Eleches and 
Urquiola, 2011). 
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treated population, which can be interpreted as the effect of the interventions on a random 
treated unit. The final assessment of these effects, however, would depend on the “welfare 
function” implicitly used by society to judge the results of the different policies and programs 
adopted. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, some programs may generate a gain on average 
but at the same time an increase in inequality. In those cases, the fact that there is a positive 
effect on average is genuinely valuable, yet it might be worth looking for complementary 
policy instruments to compensate for the increase in inequality, especially in cases when the 
cost of redistribution is high. The type and cost of the complementary interventions would 
depend on the context. We discuss these interventions in Section VI.  
Section VII concludes and suggests some challenges for future research. The 
Appendix summarizes the main findings and methodologies of the reviewed papers. 
 
II. Improving Educational Outcomes: School Inputs and School Management 
Improving educational outcomes is one of the top priorities in most countries, 
especially in the developing world, which lags behind high income countries in many 
indicators. This concern is partially driven by the idea that the formation of human capital 
through education is one of the main drivers of economic growth.  
For many years, the goal of education policies in developing countries was to increase 
spending on school inputs, such as the quantity and quality of teachers, school infrastructure, 
etc. However, the available evidence suggests that the correlation between per-student 
spending and student performance is not very robust. And more importantly, even if one 
considers the studies with credible identification strategies that find positive impacts of 
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school inputs on educational attainment, the effects seem to be relatively modest and thus 
insufficient to help the developing world catch up with developed countries. 
For example, thorough cross-country studies, such as Fuchs and Woessmann (2007) 
or Hanushek and Kimko (2000), find a weak relationship between per-student spending and 
test scores; a similar pattern has been found by Hanushek and Luque (2003), who evaluate 
the effect of class size, teacher experience and education on test scores.2 Furthermore, they 
find no evidence supporting the conventional view that school resources are relatively more 
important in poor countries.3 In contrast, Barro and Lee (2001), using panel data with fixed 
effects, find positive and significant results of increasing school resources.4 
The micro-evidence is in line with the macro evidence. There have been several 
papers employing experiments or quasi-experiments to study the effect of input-based policy 
interventions on educational outcomes, and they also find modest results. One typical 
example of these interventions is reducing class size. For example, Angrist and Lavy (1999) 
employ a regression discontinuity design to exploit a rule that determines the division into 
classes in public schools in Israel (the Maimonides rule).  These authors find that reducing 
class size induces a significant increase in reading and math scores for 5th graders and a 
                                                 
2 They used a cross-section of 37 countries in the TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and Science Study) 
data. 
3 See also Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) for an extensive survey. 
4 Only a weak relationship between spending and student outcomes has also been found in the time series 
variation within a given country. For example, Hanushek (2006) shows that even though the real spending per 
pupil in the US rose considerably through the period 1960-2000, the performances of students showed little 
improvement. Gundlach and Woessmann (2001) study 6 Asian countries between 1980 and 1994, reaching a 
similar conclusion: when inputs significantly increased in that period, cognitive achievement of pupils did not 
change substantially.  
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smaller increase in reading scores for 4th graders, while no effect is found for 3rd graders. 
Kruger (1999) studies Tennessee’s STAR Project, which randomized kindergarten students to 
small or regular-sized classes, and followed them for four years. The effects of a small class 
on student performance on standardized tests are positive on average, but modest. Chapter 2 
in this volume provides a detailed review of school resources programs in developing 
countries and concludes that such programs have modest effects on student outcomes. 
In summary, there does not seem to be a strong relationship between school inputs 
and educational outcomes. Given the large differences across countries in educational 
attainment,5 we might wonder which other interventions might help reduce these disparities. 
More specifically, we are interested in factors that could be affected by public policies. In 
fact, since the late 1990s the literature has been shifting towards the study of School 
Management reforms. The first contributions compared performance across countries with 
different school systems, but recently some studies exploited quasi-experimental and 
experimental identification strategies. The topics analyzed include school autonomy, 
external/exit exams and other accountability measures.6 Other institutional features that have 
been analyzed include the level of competition from private schools7 and characteristics of 
the pre-primary education.8 
                                                 
5 According to PISA (2009), the difference between OECD and non-OECD members is 1-2 standard deviations 
in test scores. 
6 See for example Bishop (1995, 1999 and 2006), Woessmann (2005) and Woessmann et. al. (2009); and for a 
full review see Hanushek and Woessmann, (2011). 
7  For example Woessmann et al (2009), Vandenberghe and Robin (2004) and Corten and Dronkers (2006). 
8 For example, see Schouetz et al (2008), Berlinski et al (2009), and Chapter 3 in this volume. 
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We consider that School Management might be one direction in which we could find 
an answer for how to improve educational outcomes, in light of the weak contribution of 
school resources. Finally, we would like to emphasize that an important advantage of some 
School Management interventions is that if they improve educational outcomes, they would 
likely be cost-effective as, in general, no extra resources are needed; only the existing ones 
should be managed in a different way. This is especially encouraging for developing 
countries, which typically face very tight budget constraints. 
 
III. School Decentralization 
Decentralization is the delegation of the management of resources to lower levels of 
the public administration, which leads to local provision of decentralized services. 
Decentralization of public services is a major institutional innovation throughout the world 
(Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998) and there is an ongoing wave of decentralization in the 
developing world.9 In particular, school decentralization has been advocated by public 
officers and international organizations worldwide.10  
                                                 
9 Ten percent of the World Bank’s education portfolio for the period 2000-2006 supported decentralization 
programs (approximately 15 out of 157 projects); see Barrera-Osorio et al (2009). 
10For example, the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) in the 2009 Assessment Framework 
appraised school autonomy: “Many of the world’s best-performing education systems have moved from 
bureaucratic ‘command and control’ environments towards school systems in which the people at the frontline 
have much more control of the way resources are used, people are deployed, the work is organized and the way 
in which the work gets done. They provide considerable discretion to school heads and school faculties in 
determining how resources are allocated, a factor which the report shows to be closely related to school 
performance when combined with effective accountability systems.” (PISA 2009, p. 4) 
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The main argument in support of decentralization in general, and school 
decentralization in particular, is that it brings decisions closer to the people, thereby 
alleviating information asymmetries, improving accountability and targeting the needs of the 
communities. However, decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor 
communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences, or where local 
authorities have weak technical capabilities to manage resources (Galiani et al, 2008). 
A. Theoretical Framework.  In order to discuss the trade-offs implied in 
decentralization, we provide a simple theoretical framework based on Galiani et al (2008). 
For the sake of simplicity, in the model we introduce decentralization as a binary choice. 
Assume there are i=1,2,…,I provinces, and within each one of them there are different 
communities j=1,2,…,J. Each community ij has a representative school. In order to produce 
education, ije , the government makes an effort ijb  in each community. This effort is 
determined by the spending on two educational inputs, 0aijb  and 0
b
ijb  (for instance, the 
government can invest in teachers and non-teacher educational inputs): 
  bijijaijijij bbb   1  
This linear functional form has extreme implications: if ij  were observable and 2
1
ij          
(
2
1
ij ) then the government would only invest in 
a
ijb  (
b
ijb ), while if 
2
1
ij  the government 
would be indifferent between any combination of aijb  and 
b
ijb  . We choose this extreme 
functional form to keep the algebra simple.  
In a decentralized government the decision-makers are more aware of the needs of the 
local communities: the decentralized governments can observe their own ij  directly. On the 
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other hand, we assume that the central government only knows the statistical distribution of 
ij  across communities, but it does not know the ij  of any particular community. Each 
community also invests its own managerial effort, ija , in the production of education (for 
example through voicing local preferences and demands). The production technology for 
education is given by: 
 
1
)()( ijijijij bae   
The parameter 10   captures the degree of complementarity between the efforts of the 
community and the government. The parameter 10  ij  represents the efficiency of 
community ij ’s effort. Since the authorities are closer to the people, a decentralized 
government can better complement and exploit the efforts of its members. We will represent 
this fact by assuming that jiij  0  when education is provided centrally and  ij  can be 
positive if the system is decentralized. 
In the centralized case, the problem of the government is very simple: since this case 
implies jiij  0 , every community will always choose 0
c
ija  (no managerial effort at 
the community level). The only source of (unobserved) heterogeneity across communities is 
given by the parameter ij . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the distribution of ij  
has mean 
2
1
 and is symmetric around 
2
1
. Under regularity conditions, that would imply that 
the government will split a given investment ijb  in equal parts among 
a
ijb  and 
b
ijb . Finally, 
assume that the central government’s opportunity cost from spending ijb  on education is 











ij
ijb
2
. The quadratic functional form ensures that the opportunity cost is convex. The 
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parameter 10   represents the economies of scale from providing the public good 
centrally, where a lower   suggests stronger economies of scale. Under a decentralized 
government the cost is given by 
ij
ijb
2 . Finally, denote N=I*J to the total number of 
representative schools. 
 The problem of the centralized government becomes: 
 











2
ijij
b
bNbNMax
ij
 
And the solution is: ji
N
eb cij
c
ij 

2
1 
.  
Now we can turn to the case of decentralization. The benevolent government 
maximizes the utility of each community, but using weights 0ij  – where a higher value of 
ij  indicates that the government has a stronger preference for educational outcomes in 
community ij. This captures the fact that local preferences between spending on education 
and other spending can be different in local communities than for the central government. We 
assume that under centralization ),(1 jiij  . Under decentralization it could be the case 
that the local governments may be influenced by local elites who might bias the provision of 
public services against the poor, so 1ij  in poorer communities (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 
2005). 
The timing of the model is as follows. The government first decides its managerial 
effort ijb in each community. Communities then observe the government contribution and 
choose their own managerial effort ija . Remember that the local government observes ij . To 
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keep the algebra short, we denote:  ijijij   1,maxˆ . Therefore, 2
1
ˆ ij  is a measure of 
how “special” the needs of community ij are, relative to the average needs. 
The equilibrium under decentralization is derived in Appendix A – the derivation is similar to 
that of the centralized case. The educational outcome under decentralization is: 
),(
2
ˆ
1
2
ˆ 2
2
1
2



 



ij
ijij
ij
ijijd
ije 







  
where it can be shown that 0/),(  ijij   and 0/),(   ij . We can compare how 
education in community ij does under decentralization relative to centralization by analyzing 
the trade-offs implied through comparative statics in the following expression: 
   12 ),(ˆ
2
1
Nee ijijij
c
ij
d
ij , 
where a positive number would mean that decentralization produces a better outcome. First of 
all, notice that all communities share the parameters   ,, N , while the parameters 
 ijijij  ˆ,,  are specific to each community ij, thereby generating heterogeneous effects. 
A lower   or a higher N represent the economies of scale from providing education 
centrally. Both parameters increase the relative attractiveness of the centralized system, 
represented by the term 1N , whose effect is homogeneous across communities. 
Decentralization brings decisions closer to the people, thereby alleviating information 
asymmetries (e.g. Oates, 1972). The benefits from decentralization are increasing in ijˆ , 
which measures how “special” the needs of community ij are. Through this channel, we 
would expect both the poorest and richest communities to benefit the most from 
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decentralization given their largest distance from the median community in the country. Thus, 
this channel has an ambiguous effect on educational inequality across communities.  
By bringing decisions closer to the people, decentralization also improves 
accountability and empowers participation of the local community, which is represented by a 
greater ij  (since 0/),(  ijij  ). Furthermore, this effect will be augmented by the 
degree of complementarity between government and community effort, which is represented 
by a higher   (since 0/),(   ij ). The effect of ij  is highly heterogeneous across 
communities: it is likely that communities with higher physical and human capital will have a 
higher ij , which will then magnify the effects of education. Indeed, the policy-makers can 
explicitly target these aspects of school autonomy (e.g. Pradhan et al, 2011). 
There is only one parameter left to analyze: 0ij  , which represents how local 
preferences for spending in education differ relative to the preferences of the central 
government. Remember we assumed ),(1 jiij   under centralization. In the case of 
decentralization it could be one (as in centralization), or different than one. If 1ij  , the local 
government gives relatively more importance to education than the central government. The 
interesting case is when under decentralization 1ij , which could have two possible 
interpretations.
 
On one hand, it could be that local governments have different preferences – e.g. they 
consider spending in health to be more important than in education. In this case, 1ij   
would decrease the production of education under decentralization, but it would still increase 
social welfare as local governments are choosing a mix of spending closer to local needs 
(Faguet and Sanchez, 2006). Regarding inequality, all communities should experience an 
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increase in welfare (and a decrease in education spending), relative to the centralized case; as 
a community’s parameter gets further from 1, the greater are the community’s gains. 
On the other hand, 1ij  may indicate that local governments are more prone to be 
dominated by the local elite (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005 and 2006). In particular, this 
effect is more likely to appear in poor areas, where the institutions are weaker. As a 
consequence, this effect of decentralization is likely to exacerbate inequality in educational 
outcomes across communities. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence about how local 
governments can hurt local minorities (see Alesina et al, 200411). 
In summary, the theoretical model raises the possibility of an equity-efficiency trade-
off from decentralization: even if decentralization had a large positive effect on the average 
community, it could be very prejudicial for poor communities or for communities with bad 
governance. Thus, in the empirical literature review that follows we will focus both on the 
average effect of decentralization and on the distribution of these effects across communities. 
B. Review of the Empirical Literature.  There are several strands in the empirical 
literature on decentralization. Firstly, there are cross-country studies that look at the 
regression of educational attainment on measures of school decentralization (and other 
control variables); they find positive correlation between student performance and 
decentralization (e.g. Woessmann (2003)12 and PISA (2009)13). Secondly, other papers report 
                                                 
11 Alesina et al. use data on American school districts, school attendance areas, municipalities, and special 
districts, and find strong evidence that more heterogeneous populations (e.g. in terms of race, income) end up 
with more decentralized districts, thereby accentuating the inequalities in the local communities. 
12 Woessmann (2003) employs micro data on 39 countries and finds that student performance correlates 
positively with different decentralization variables (control mechanisms and exams, school autonomy in 
personnel, process decisions, and the influence of teachers on teaching methods). 
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positive results from decentralization using a before-and-after-reforms analysis. For example, 
Faguet and Sanchez (2006) show that in Bolivia the priorities of local governments changed 
after decentralization, redirecting more investment towards education, and in Colombia 
decentralization of education finance improved enrollment rates in public schools. In addition 
to this, other studies have compared schools that changed autonomy levels with schools that 
did not. Jimenez and Sawada (1999, 2003) study the impact of EDUCO program (Education 
with Community Participation) in El Salvador, which was designed to expand education to 
isolated rural areas by decentralizing education through the direct involvement and 
participation of parents and community groups. They find that the program did not have a 
significant effect on math and language tests, but did have a positive effect on students’ 
attendance and probability of continuing in school.14 
Many authors have studied the decentralization process in Brazil. Madeira (2007) 
exploits longitudinal data on primary schools to evaluate the effects of the decentralization 
reform in Sao Paulo. He finds that decentralization increased dropout rates and failure rates 
across all primary school grades but improved several school resources, like the number of 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 PISA 2009 suggested that the prevalence of schools’ autonomy to define and elaborate their curricula and 
assessments relates positively to the performance of school systems, even after accounting for national income 
(PISA, 2009). 
14 In a similar spirit, King and Özler (2005) provide an impact evaluation of Nicaragua’s school autonomy 
reform that started in 1993 and consisted in giving legal status and several key management tasks to school 
councils. The results indicate that autonomy de jure does not affect student’s performance. However, higher de 
facto autonomy in some administrative decisions, especially in the ability to hire and fire school personnel, is 
correlated with higher student achievement. 
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VCRs and TVs per hundred students, and increased enrollment.15 The author notes that the 
results are partially driven by the democratization of school access. Paes de Barros and 
Mendoça (1998) distinguish between three processes in Brazilian’s decentralization during 
the 1980’s: direct transfer of funds to schools, election of principals, and the creation of local 
school councils. They find positive but modest results of decentralization and an increase in 
inequality, since committees in low-income areas where less prone to be involved in school 
management. 
However, the identification strategy of the above-mentioned papers does not allow 
one to rigorously assess the causal impact of decentralization on educational outcomes. This 
is mainly due to a potential selection bias when the decentralization/program assignment rule 
is not exogenous or because there are other, unobservable changes that are contemporaneous 
with the decentralization process, which may confound estimates of the effects of 
decentralization. Indeed, there seems to be evidence of the presence of differences in 
unobservable characteristics related to decentralization across groups: Gunnarsson et al. 
(2009) report that school autonomy and parental participation vary more within countries 
than between countries, which suggests that the decision of local communities to exercise 
their autonomy is probably endogenous. 
To overcome these potential problems, Galiani et al. (2008) rely on a quasi-
experimental design to exploit exogenous variability in school decentralization. That can 
provide a plausibly credible identification of the causal effect of decentralization on 
educational attainment. They take advantage of a decentralization reform in Argentina, where 
two systems of secondary schools – one administered by the provinces and the other by the 
                                                 
15 Furthermore, he reports that the negative effects from decentralization were greater in the poorest 
communities. 
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central government – existed side by side in the same communities for over a century. 
Between 1992 and 1994, the central government transferred all its secondary schools to 
provincial control.16 The authors use the exogenous variation in the jurisdiction of 
administration of secondary schools generated by this policy intervention to identify the 
causal effect of school decentralization on educational outcomes. They employ a dataset 
containing information for the period 1994-1999 on 3,456 public schools, accounting for 99% 
of all public secondary schools:  2,360 were always provincial and 1,096 were transferred 
from the national to the provincial government between 1992 and 1994. Specifically, they 
compare changes in student outcomes at different lengths of exposure to decentralization to 
changes in outcomes of students in schools that were always under provincial control.  
Galiani et al (2008) find that decentralization had an overall positive effect on student 
test scores: math test scores increased by 3.5% and Spanish test scores rose by 5.4%, on 
average after 5 years of decentralized administration. However, the gains were exclusively in 
schools located in non-poor municipalities. In fact, in their most robust results -including 
province-year fixed effects- they report that decentralization did not improve average test 
scores in schools located in poor municipalities. 
Finally, to date there is scarce experimental evidence of decentralization reforms. To 
the best of our knowledge, the available experimental evidence is based on programs that 
employed a different notion of decentralization than the one implied in the reported non-
experimental and quasi-experimental settings reviewed previously. For example, Benveniste 
                                                 
16 The decentralization law did not change the distribution of resources among provinces. It also guaranteed that 
the provinces would not have to bear additional financial burden by taking on the operation of the transferred 
schools.  
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and Marshall (2004) randomized locally managed grants for schools17 in Cambodia with 
positive average results. And Lassibile et al (2010) study workflow-enhancing interventions 
in Madagascar, showing positive average impacts of these interventions.18  
In summary, most of the studies with a credible identification strategy suggest that 
there are positive average effects from different types of decentralization reforms (see Table 
1). However, we should note that the effects of decentralization reforms depend on many 
country-specific features such as the political regime, power of local governments and 
commitment of the central administration to transfer funds, among others. Consequently the 
generalization of these results is problematic without understanding the underlying structural 
mechanisms at work. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
As far as the distributional effects are concerned, those papers that study impacts 
across groups tend to find that poor communities fail to gain from decentralization reform, 
which in turn increases inequality. There is also evidence in the developed world that richer 
                                                 
17 In the same line, Chaudhury and Parajuli (2010) study the Community School Support Project that 
randomized schools to an advocacy campaign and gave them a grant. Short run estimates show a significant 
impact on certain schooling outcomes (improvement in out of school children, repetition and equity, in the sense 
that disadvantaged castes perform better), although there is no evidence of improved learning outcomes. 
18 The interventions at the school level, reinforced by interventions at the subdistrict and district levels, 
improved school attendance, reduced grade repetition, and raised test scores (particularly in Malagasy and 
mathematics), although the gains in learning at the end of the evaluation period were not always statistically 
significant. Interventions limited to the subdistrict and district levels proved largely ineffective. 
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regions benefit relatively more from decentralization, though the poorer also experience net 
gains.19 
We consider that it is of first order importance to disentangle the channels through 
which decentralization reform affects communities in order to help those that do not benefit 
from it. Following the stylized model, there could be different explanations such as the 
presence of powerful local elites that may impose their own needs, or parents that may not 
know how to collaborate in the production of education. If we can identify the specific 
reasons for the failure of decentralization reform in poor communities, then we will be able to 
design complementary interventions to make the most out of decentralization. 
 
IV. Tracking 
The concept of tracking refers to a way in which students of the same cohort are 
allocated into classes: i.e., by tracking students by prior achievement and assigning the best 
half to one class and the weaker half to another class. Tracking is a controversial policy: on 
the one hand, by grouping students in more homogeneous groups teachers find it easier to 
target their teaching to the students, which improves educational outcomes; but on the other 
hand, if students benefit from better peers, tracking could impose serious disadvantages on 
low-achieving students by pooling them with worse students. Therefore, tracking – like 
decentralization – implies a trade-off between equity and efficiency. Also, teachers can also 
react by changing the way they teach because of tracking, such as targeting to the best or to 
median students. 
                                                 
19 See Salinas and Sole-Olle (2009) for a study of the Spanish decentralization process in 1978-2005, or 
Barankay and Lockwood (2007) for an analysis of decentralization in the Swiss cantons. 
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A. A Model of Tracking.  Before stepping into the empirical literature, in the spirit of 
Duflo et al. (2011), we first present a stylized model to illustrate this trade-off. Denote ij  to 
be the uni-dimensional skill level for student i in class j, which is a continuous variable with 
support   , . The teacher can “target” a single ability level: e.g. he or she can focus on 
teaching the least gifted students, the median student, or the most gifted students. Let 
  ,ijT  denote the ability level chosen by the teacher as a target. The cost for student i in 
class j from being in the class is greater the more distant the student’s ij  is from ijT . Because 
the teacher wants to maximize the educational outcomes, his problem is conceptually 
equivalent to the Hotelling problem of horizontal differentiation with a Social Planner. 
The selection of ijT  depends on the distribution of skills in the class. Figures 1a and 
1b show two different distributions of skills within a class. In Figure 1a the distribution of 
skills is uni-modal, so the teacher will likely choose ijT  equal to the mode of the distribution. 
In Figure 1b the distribution of skills is bi-modal, so the choice of ijT  is likely to be either at 
one of the modes or in the middle of the two modes, depending on the convexity of the cost 
function of the students and on how much the teacher values equity vs. efficiency. The 
benefits from tracking will be higher if skills are distributed like in Figure 1b rather than in 
Figure 1a. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
However, tracking may lead to greater inequality if there are peer effects in the 
classroom. Indeed, there is empirical evidence about the importance of intra-class peer effects 
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(see for example Jackson (2010), Zimmerman (2003), Ding and Lehrer (2006) or Burke and 
Sass (2008)). 
We have to take into account that peer effects can substantially change the 
distribution of tracking effects. Let jN  be class j’s size. Students choose study effort, ije . The 
educational outcome, ijy , is not only a function of own effort and type, but also a function of 
the efforts and types of the other students inside the classroom, ij . One possible functional 
form could be: 



ikj
ijij 1-N
1
  with),g( kjkjijijij eey  , 
where )g(  is an increasing function that takes positive values, which represents the 
complementarity between own effective effort (and type) and peers’ effort (and type). Peer 
effects work through two channels. Firstly, tracking has direct peer effects because it changes 
the composition of skills in the classroom, so every student faces peers with a different 
composition of skills. Secondly, tracking has indirect peer effects, because the students adapt 
to each other’s effort.20 
To clarify the effects of tracking, imagine that we take two identical groups of 
students and we do the following experiment: we take the least-skilled student from group 1 
and swap it with the most skilled student from group 2. Both groups now have more 
homogenous skills, so on average the teacher can better target the teaching style: i.e. ijT  will 
go up (down) in group 1 (2).  
                                                 
20 Note that, depending on the equilibrium concept that one uses, students may not fully internalize the social 
benefits from making an effort and thus under-provide effort relative to the social optimum. However, this 
feature is not critical for the results that follow. 
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We can see what will happen with students in both groups. Most students in group 1 
will be closer to the teacher’s target, and therefore they will increase their effort, ije . They 
will also benefit directly from having better peers, and from the reinforced effort through the 
peer effects, )g( ij . Thus, the welfare of most students in this group is expected to rise. 
Nevertheless, the least skilled students in group 1 might actually become slightly further 
away from the teaching target. Even in this case, they will benefit in net terms because they 
gain from having better peers and from their peers’ higher effort (through the reinforced 
learning, )g( ij ). In group 2 everyone will face a negative direct effect because of having less 
skilled peers, through )g( ij . Since the group is more homogeneous, most students get closer 
to the teacher’s target, which is beneficial (although the most skilled students in the group can 
become further away from the target). Thus, the net effect on the welfare of the members of 
group 2 will depend upon the importance of the magnitude of the peer effects, )g( , relative 
to the potential gains from better teacher targeting. 
The tracking intervention consists of repeating the above intervention until we reach 
two non-overlapping groups of students. If there are no peer effects, then the net effect from 
tracking will be positive for everyone except for the students that were originally near the 
median skill (who became actually further away from the teaching target). The effect on 
inequality would be ambiguous, depending on whether the top individuals in the higher class 
benefit more than the bottom individuals in the lower class. 
But if peer effects are significant, then anything can happen. If peer effects mean 
mainly that students’ efforts are very complementary, then every student may benefit in net 
terms, as the students that benefited from better targeting will exert a higher effort and thus 
benefit the students who face negative direct effects (i.e. those with worse targeting and/or 
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worse peers). However, if the direct benefits from better targeting are small relative to the 
direct negative effect of having worse peers, then most students in the lower class will be 
worse off with tracking while most students in the higher class will be better off with 
tracking. As a consequence, sizeable peer effects can induce an efficiency-equity trade-off. 
B. Review of the Empirical Literature.  Table 2 summarizes the main findings of 
the studies that have analyzed tracking interventions. The most elementary empirical strategy 
to assess the effects from tracking consists of comparing students in tracking and non-
tracking schools. The earlier empirical estimations seemed to suggest that although tracking 
was beneficial for the high-skilled students, it ended up hurting the low-skilled students, thus 
augmenting inequality (see for instance Kerckhoff (1986), Hoffer (1992) and Argys et al 
(1996)). In particular, the PISA 2009 Assessment Framework was very critical of tracking 
programs because of the possibility that they increase the differences across students while 
not improving overall performance.21 Exploiting a more elaborated strategy, Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2006) also look at country-level differences, but using students of different 
cohorts to get a difference-in-difference estimate. They still find that early tracking 
substantially increases educational inequality and they also argue that early tracking reduces 
mean performance. 
 
                                                 
21 “School systems that seek to cater to different students’ needs through a high level of differentiation in the 
institutions, grade levels and classes have not succeeded in producing superior overall results, and in some 
respects they have lower-than-average and more socially unequal performance. … In countries where 15-year-
olds are divided into more tracks based on their abilities, overall performance is not enhanced, and the younger 
the age at which selection for such tracks first occurs, the greater the differences in student performance, … 
without improved overall performance.” (PISA, 2009; p. 15) 
 Glewwe, Chapter 6, p.25 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
Betts and Shkolnik (2000) provide a good summary of the non-experimental 
literature, and argue that the existing consensus against tracking was largely based on invalid 
comparisons. Intuitively, most of the papers they review compare the top students or the 
bottom students in tracking schools to the average students in non-tracking schools.22 Indeed, 
Betts and Shkolnik (2000) show that when students of similar ability levels in tracking and 
non-tracking high schools are compared, the findings are strikingly different: high-ability 
students benefit from tracking, low-ability students neither benefit nor get hurt, although 
there is some evidence that middle scoring students may be hurt23 (see also Figlio and Page 
(2002)).  
However, the decisions to work/enroll in tracking/non-tracking schools by teachers 
and parents/students might be endogenous. Ideally we would like to have experimental or 
quasi-experimental evidence on tracking programs to avoid this potential problem. 
Fortunately, there is one paper with experimental evidence that provides a credible 
identification strategy for the effect of tracking on students’ performance.  
Duflo et al. (2011) performed a randomized controlled trial to study the effects of 
tracking in Kenya. In 121 schools that used to have a single first-grade class, that grade was 
                                                 
22 In a similar spirit, Manning and Pischke (2006) show that controlling for baseline scores is not sufficient to 
eliminate the selection bias when comparing students attending comprehensive versus selective schools in the 
United Kingdom. 
23 The fact that middle scoring students are the group that benefits least from tracking is consistent with the 
model presented, when they are the only ones getting further away from the teacher target after the tracking 
intervention. 
 Glewwe, Chapter 6, p.26 
split into two sections. In 60 schools, randomly selected out of the 121, students were 
assigned to sections based on prior achievement as measured by first term grades, assigning 
the top and bottom halves to different sections. In the remaining 61 schools, students were 
randomly assigned to one of the two sections. The findings are very encouraging for 
supporters of tracking: students in tracking schools scored on average 0.14 standard 
deviations higher than students in non-tracking schools at the end of the program (18 months 
later);  students at all levels of the distribution benefited from tracking, and this effect 
persisted one year after the program ended.  
Regarding the direct and indirect peer effects discussed above, the authors find that 
while the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving 
pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach at their level. Together, these results show that 
peers affect students both directly and indirectly by influencing teacher behavior, in particular 
by influencing the teacher’s effort and choice of target teaching level (closer to the median 
student).24 Therefore, these findings suggest that there is a substantial chance that tracking 
could be a beneficial policy.  
Tracking is particularly attractive because the intervention is standardized; the only 
need for its implementation is to change the rule by which students are grouped into classes. 
In contrast, the details of school decentralization usually depend on many characteristics of 
the country (the size of the country, the power of local elites, etc.).   
Nevertheless, there are some concerns regarding the external validity of this 
experiment that should be taken into account. For instance, as Duflo et al. (2011) point out, 
the behavior of teachers is crucial for the results: if the policy is generalized, teachers may 
                                                 
24 This happens in a context in which teachers have convex payoffs in student test scores. 
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sort to the higher or lower level sections of the classes (see also Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 
2011). They also emphasize that in the experiment many key factors that could affect the 
results were left unchanged, such as the resources for the classes and the class size. It could 
be the case, however, that in a scaling-up process, the resources would not be split evenly 
between classes. For example resources may be allocated to help the worse-achievers to catch 
up.  
Furthermore, it might be that the degree of peer effects may change if the experiment 
is performed in higher grades (instead of 1st and 2nd), because the effects may be stronger in 
older children (e.g. they compete for status, they collaborate in homework).  Also, there are 
some cultural and socio-economic factors that may change the results in other countries, 
because they may affect the initial distribution of students. For instance, in very poor 
communities there are many students with special needs (e.g. suffering from domestic 
violence, malnutrition), so the problem of the teacher may look more like Figure 1b, with the 
low mode of students being those with special needs. On the contrary, in not-so-poor 
communities the students’ needs may be substantially more homogenous, thereby reducing 
the potential targeting-benefits from tracking. Duflo et al. (2011) make a similar point, 
arguing that their results are more likely to be found in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asian 
countries, rather than in the U.S. Hopefully, further experimental evidence will contribute to 
our understanding of the key assumptions to ensure the external validity of these findings. 
 
V. Teacher Incentives 
The role of compensation policy in influencing worker performance has been 
extensively analyzed in the theoretical and empirical literature. In this section we analyze 
different compensation and incentive-based policies. Of particular interest in the recent 
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empirical literature are the effects that compensation policies have on worker productivity, 
often referred to as “incentive effects”. More specifically, we are interested in whether paying 
teachers on the basis of their students’ performance induces them to improve the overall 
quality of teaching and hence increases student learning.  
Mostly, teachers are paid according to observable characteristics, like educational 
background, experience or tenure. However, those measures are usually poor predictors of 
better student outcomes (see, among others, Rivkin et al. (2005)). The idea behind paying 
teachers on the basis of direct measures of their students’ performance is that this provides 
them an incentive to improve the quality of their teaching and thereby increase their students’ 
learning. 
  A. Theoretical Framework.  In this section we discuss interventions that introduce 
pay-for-performance incentives. We adapt the model in Franceschelli et al. (2008) on 
compensation in firms to a school setting in order to formalize two probable consequences 
from the introduction of pay-for-performance interventions: i) it might increase the effort 
(outcomes) of both high- and low-productivity teachers; ii) it might also increase the turnover 
among low-productivity teachers. 
Teachers’ utility depends positively on income, T, and negatively on effort, X: 
u(T,X), with u′T(  ) > 0 and u′X(  ) < 0. A teacher’s output is given by the performance of the 
students, q, which depends on the teacher’s level of ability, A, and his or her effort, X: q = 
f(X,A) with ∂f(  )/∂X ) > 0 and ∂f(  )/∂A ) > 0. If a teacher is fired, he or she will receive a 
compensation equal to Z, and if the teacher is not fired, he or she will receive a wage W =  Y 
+ b(q) > Z (note that the wage may depend upon the teacher’s performance). 
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The probability of a teacher being fired is given by: 1 if 0q<q ; 
01
1)(
qq
qq
q


  if 
0 1q q<q  and 0 if 1q q . That is, the teacher will be fired with probability one if her 
students do not achieve an average score of at least 0q ; if q  is between 0q  and 1q  then the 
probability that a teacher will be fired is linearly decreasing on the level of performance of 
her students; and if the average performance of the students surpasses the threshold 1q  then 
the probability of being fired is zero. Recall that the teacher’s wage, if she is not fired, is 
given by W =  Y + b(q). There are two possible wage schedules. Under the flat wage scheme, 
b(q) = 0 for every q (i.e. an hourly wage). Under the pay per performance scheme b(q) = 0 if 
q ≤ 1q  and b(q) = b*(q - 1q ) if q > 1q . In sum, the employer (schools) sets three key 
parameters: b},q,{q 10 . 
We define q*(A) as the Nash equilibrium solution to this problem. It can be shown 
that, under the hourly-wage system, q*(A) is an increasing function of A under the basic-
wage scheme (Proposition 1 in Franceschelli et al., 2008). Intuitively, higher-ability teachers 
will display a better performance because by doing so they can reduce their chances of being 
fired. However, note that if the probability of being fired is negligible or even null as a 
function of the students’ performance – as it is often the case for school teachers in 
developing countries - then teachers will exert very low, if any effort. 
It can also be shown that under the pay-for-performance scheme there will be a cutoff 
level A* such that if A> A*, then the teacher will decide to produce in the piece-rate segment 
and if A< A*, the teacher will decide to produce in the basic wage segment when offered the 
option (Proposition 2 in Franceschelli et al., 2008). We will refer to “low-ability” teachers as 
those with A< A* and to “high-ability” teachers as those with A>A*. 
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Proposition 3 in Franceschelli et al. (2008) analyzes the dynamics when the system 
changes from a flat wage regime to a pay-for-performance scheme. They show that both low 
and high-ability teachers will raise their output levels, but for different reasons: low-ability 
teachers will raise their output because of the stricter endogenous dismissal policy and high-
ability teachers will increase their output in response to the introduction of the piece-rate 
component in the wage scheme. Thus, the channel of the incentive effect is different for those 
workers seeking the basic wage and those workers seeking the piece-rate component of the 
wage. Finally, Franceschelli et al. (2008) show that – at least under certain parametric 
assumptions - a rise in the turnover rate for low-ability teachers is expected after the 
implementation of the piece-rate with a basic wage. 
Franceschelli et al. (2010) test the predictions of this model in a quasi-experimental 
setting when a textile firm decided to shift one of its plants to a piece-rate plus basic wage 
scheme while the other plant continued to be paid on an hourly basis. Using longitudinal data 
on worker productivity in the two plants before and after the first plant changed its payment 
scheme, they find that the implementation of the pay per performance system had a strong 
positive effect on productivity (28 percent, on average) and that many workers continued to 
receive the basic wage after the changeover to the new incentive scheme. The effect of 
treatment was a 29 percent increase in the average productivity of workers aiming at the basic 
wage and a 26 percent increase for workers seeking the piece-rate component of the wage. 
Thus, the evidence presented in the paper suggests that the change in the incentive scheme 
made, endogenously, the dismissal policy of the firm stricter, inducing even low-ability 
workers to increase their productivity. 
B. Review of the Empirical Literature.  The main obstacle in assessing incentive 
effects empirically is the endogeneity of contractual arrangements. There are some recent 
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papers, however, that analyze the effect of different compensation schemes for teachers using 
experiments to induce exogenous changes in the compensation schemes (see Table 3 for a 
summary). Nevertheless, they find mixed results. 
 
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
 Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) provide evidence from a large-scale 
randomized evaluation of a teacher performance pay program implemented in 300 public 
schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. They study the effect of a teacher performance 
pay (a bonus calibrated to be around 3 percent of a typical teacher’s annual salary).25 They 
randomly selected 100 schools to implement performance pay at the teacher level, randomly 
selected another 100 schools to implement it at the school level, with the remaining 100 
randomly chosen schools serving as the control group. They find that the teacher performance 
pay program was effective in improving student learning: at the end of two years of the 
program, students in the 200 schools with incentive systems performed significantly better 
than those in comparison schools by 0.27 and 0.17 standard deviations (SD) in the 
mathematics and language tests, respectively.26 They found a minimum average treatment 
effect of 0.1 SD at every percentile of the distribution of baseline test scores, suggesting 
broad-based gains in test scores as a result of paying teachers based on their students’ 
performance. 
                                                 
25 The authors studied two types of teacher performance pay (group bonuses based on school average  
performance and bonuses paid to teachers based on their individual performance). 
26 School-level group incentives and teacher-level individual incentives performed equally well in the first year, 
but the individual incentive schools outperformed the group incentive schools after 2 years of the program. 
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The authors find no evidence of any adverse consequences as a result of the incentive 
programs. Students in incentive schools did significantly better not only in mathematics and 
language (for which there were incentives) but also in science and social studies (for which 
there were no incentives), suggesting positive spillover effects. The suggested channel 
through which the impact of the incentive scheme operates is not an increase of teacher 
attendance but greater teaching effort conditional on being present: teacher interviews 
indicate that teachers in incentive schools were more likely to have exerted extra effort such 
as assigning additional homework and class work, providing practice tests, and conducting 
extra classes after school.  
The authors of this study also compare this intervention to other interventions of 
similar costs that consisted of additional schooling inputs. The resource-based interventions 
were also effective in raising test scores, but the teacher incentive program was three times as 
cost effective in raising test scores. 
Regarding the effect of this intervention on the distribution of test scores, the authors 
find that the quantile treatment effects of the treatment are positive at every percentile and 
increasing. However, the program also increased the variance of test scores. The authors 
claim that this may reflect variance in teacher responsiveness to the incentive program, as 
opposed to variance in student responsiveness to the treatment by initial learning levels. 
Lastly, the authors cannot study the effects on turnover because the experiment was designed 
so that turnover is almost ruled out (there was an agreement with the government to minimize 
transfers into and out of the sample schools for the duration of the study). 
Another source of experimental evidence for a developing country is Glewwe et al. 
(2010). The authors report results from a randomized evaluation that provided primary school 
teachers (grades 4–8) in rural Kenya with group incentives based on test scores. They found 
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that while test scores went up in program schools in the short run, the students did not retain 
the gains after the incentive program ended. Furthermore, teacher attendance did not 
improve, homework assignments did not increase, and pedagogy did not change, although 
teachers did increase their effort to raise short-run test scores by conducting more test 
preparation sessions. The authors of this study interpret these results as being consistent with 
teachers expending effort toward short-term increases in test scores but not toward long-term 
learning.27 
Finally, Duflo et al. (forthcoming) provide a valuable step in the direction of 
understanding incentives for teachers by combining experimental variation with the structural 
estimation of a model. They worked with single-teacher non-formal education centers in the 
rural villages of Rajasthan, India, where an NGO gave teachers in 57 randomly selected 
program schools a camera with a tamper-proof date and time function, to check attendance of 
teachers. Each teacher was then paid according to a nonlinear function of the number of valid 
school days for which they were actually present. The other 56 schools were randomly 
allocated to the control group. The reduced-form results of the program were positive: 
absenteeism by teachers fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group. Teacher 
attendance increased for both low and high quality teachers (those scoring below and above 
the median test scores on the teacher skills exam conducted prior to the program).28 Children 
in the program schools had more teaching days and, conditional on the school being open, 
                                                 
27 The program was designed to offer prizes only to teachers who were already employed before the program to 
avoid that the entry and exit rates of teachers would be altered by the introduction of the incentives scheme. 
28 The program impact on attendance was larger for below median teachers (a 24 percentage point increase 
versus a 15 percentage point increase for above median teachers). However, this was due to the fact that the 
program brought below median teachers to the same level of attendance as above median teachers (78 percent). 
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teachers were found teaching during random visits (thus, the authors did not find evidence of 
multitasking or loss of intrinsic motivation due to the program). As a consequence of more 
instruction days with no apparent reduction of teacher effort, children's test scores increased 
by 0.17 standard deviations in treatment schools.29 Children who could write at the time of 
the pre-test gained the most from the program (they had mid-line test scores 0.25 standard 
deviations higher in treatment schools than in comparison schools), suggesting that those 
more advanced before the program were better equipped to benefit from it. 
The authors complement these results with the estimation of a structural dynamic 
model of teacher labor supply to understand which component of the program affected the 
behavior of the teachers (monitoring or financial incentives) and assess the effect of other 
payment structures. They find that teachers are responsive to the financial incentives: the 
elasticity of labor supply with respect to the level of the financial bonus is between 0.20 and 
0.30 and, when the bonus is set to zero, the model closely predicts the difference in 
attendance between teachers in the treatment and control schools. 
C. Contract Teachers.  In recent decades there has been a sharp increase in student 
enrollment in developing countries. One way to bring them into the education system without 
prohibitively expensive increases in the teacher salary budget is to arrange for local hiring of 
teachers on short-term contracts. We refer to the teachers under these contracts as “Contract 
Teachers” (De Laat and Vegas, 2005). In most of these large-scale teacher recruitment 
                                                 
29 Over the 30 months in which attendance was tracked, the treatment reduced teacher’s absenteeism rates (42% 
in control group vs. 22% in treatment group), increased student’s test scores (by 0.17 standard deviations) and 
raised the probability of students being accepted into regular schools (by 40%). 
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programs the teachers are not employed in civil servant positions, they receive considerably 
lower salaries, have less tenure and usually significantly less professional training.30  
This policy is highly controversial. In spite of this, some economists and policy-
makers believe that increasing the use of contract teachers may have been one of the most 
efficient innovations in providing primary education in developing countries. The benefit 
most cited in the literature is that contract teachers face superior incentives compared to 
tenured civil-service teachers: they must work hard to build a reputation and eventually 
receive another appointment or even a civil servant position. Civil-service teacher positions 
are highly demanded in some countries because hiring and supervision is centrally conducted 
and salaries are much higher than the salaries necessary to clear the market. Because contract 
teachers are locally hired, it is possible that this may reduce their absenteeism through closer 
monitoring and better target the needs of their students - advantages associated to 
decentralization reform. 
At the same time, many arguments have been raised against contract teacher 
programs. Contracted teachers usually have less teaching experience and, due to their short-
term contracts, they cannot get involved in following the progress of their students. Some 
authors also worry that the extrinsic incentives may crowd out the teacher's intrinsic 
motivation to exert teaching effort (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). In a related note, providing 
incentives for some outcomes may end up perversely distorting the allocation of effort 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), as illustrated by Glewwe et al. (2010). Also, one may 
worry that contract teachers may de-professionalize teaching and thus impoverish the status 
of teaching as a profession (e.g. Bennell, 2004). 
                                                 
30 See Duthilleul (2005) for a review of contract teacher programs in several countries. 
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Table 3 summarizes the main findings of the studies analyzing this intervention. Some 
papers exploit non-experimental data to study the relative performance of contract teachers. 
For example, De Laat and Vegas (2005) compare the performance of contract teachers’ 
students with other students in Togo, Bourdon et al. (2006) study contract teachers in Niger, 
and Bourdon et al. (2007) examine contract teachers in Niger, Mali, and Togo. The findings 
are mixed. On one hand, the findings of De Laat and Vegas (2005) suggest that students of 
regular teachers clearly outperform those of contract teachers, and Bourdon et al. (2006) 
argue that contract teachers may deteriorate education quality. On the other hand, Bourdon et 
al. (2007) suggest that contract teachers may have a positive impact, although they do find 
negative impacts when it is implemented in a more centralized manner. In addition to these 
studies, Goyal and Pandey (2009) report that contract teachers consistently demonstrated 
higher effort than regular teachers. In addition, in the Indian states they studied contract 
teachers were actually more educated than regular teachers. Finally, Kremer et al. (2005) 
report that contract teachers appear to have a rate of absenteeism similar to that of regular 
teachers. Likewise, Chaudhury et al. (2006) report that contract teachers in five countries are 
no less likely to be absent than other teachers (but not in a sixth country). 
From the perspective of identification, comparing students with contract teachers to 
those with regular teachers can be misleading if, for example, the areas with the poorest 
educational outcomes may be more likely to hire contract teachers, generating a spurious 
negative correlation between contract teachers and student performance. Fortunately, there is 
an emerging literature exploiting experimental variation in the use of contract teachers. 
Contrary to the mixed results of the non-experimental studies, the experimental results 
suggest that contract teachers tend to have positive results.  
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The first experimental evidence comes from the Kenyan Extra Teacher Program 
(Duflo et al., 2007).31 The 210 schools in the program were randomly assigned to two groups: 
140 treatment (or “ETP”) schools and 70 comparison schools. In 70 of the 140 treatment 
schools, first grade pupils were randomly assigned to either a newly hired contract teacher or 
a regular, civil service teacher. Those contract teachers had the same academic qualifications 
as regular teachers but were paid less than one fourth as much as the regular teachers. In 
treated schools, they were roughly 16 percentage points more likely to be in class and 
teaching than civil service teachers in comparison schools. Students assigned to contracted 
teachers scored 0.23 standard deviations higher and attended school 2 percent more often 
than students who had been randomly assigned to civil service teachers in program schools. 
Moreover, students of contract teachers were 5.5 percentage points more likely to have 
reached third grade in 2007 than students in treatment schools taught by civil service 
teachers. 
Similar results are reported by Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010), who analyze a 
contract teacher program conducted in India, where 100 randomly-chosen government-run 
rural primary schools in Andhra Pradesh were provided with an extra contract teachers. After 
two years, students in schools with an extra contract teacher performed significantly better on 
academic tests than those in comparison schools, by 0.15 and 0.13 standard deviations on 
mathematics and language tests, respectively. While all students benefited from the program, 
the extra contract teacher was particularly beneficial for students in their first year of school 
and students in remote schools. However, these results might also be driven by the reduction 
in class size that resulted of adding a teacher. The authors also find, using four different non-
experimental estimation procedures, that contract teachers are no less effective in improving 
                                                 
31 See also Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2011). 
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student learning than regular teachers who are more qualified, better trained, and paid a five 
times higher salary. Furthermore, contract teachers were significantly less likely to be absent 
from school than civil-service teachers (16% vs. 27%). Finally, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) 
review other programs that provide indirect experimental evidence about the benefits of 
locally-hired teachers (or volunteers) to help the more disadvantaged students.32 For example, 
in a remedial education program reviewed, which hired young women to teach students 
lagging behind in India, they find that the intervention increased average test scores for all 
children in treatment schools by 0.28 standard deviations, mostly due to large gains 
experienced by children at the bottom of the test-score distribution. 
A key goal for future research would be to disentangle the channel through which this 
better performance of contract teachers works. Some argue that the increase in performance is 
related to the fact that contract teachers perceive their temporary positions as a probation 
period to obtain a civil service position. For example, in the area of Kenya where the 
experiment by Duflo et al. (2007) was performed, 32% of the contract teachers in the 
program eventually obtained a civil service position. Also, in West African countries 
teachers’ unions have made the extension of job stability to contract teachers a political goal 
(Bruns et al., 2011). If it is inevitable that contract teachers will become civil servants, then 
we need to study whether their behavior, once they are upgraded, differs from the behavior of 
the teachers that started their careers as civil servants. If they do not differ, then a contract 
                                                 
32 They report the results of the remedial education program in India (Banerjee et al., 2007), which hired young 
women to teach students that lagged behind in basic literacy and numeric skills, with positive results. Likewise, 
Banerjee et al. (2008) study a reading intervention in rural India that trained community volunteers who had a 
tenth- or twelfth-grade education for four days to teach children how to read, which significantly improved 
reading achievement. 
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teacher system can be viewed as a successful probation mechanism (see Gordon et al, 2006), 
but one with effects that do not persist after teachers become civil servants.  
Many of the papers advocating for contract teachers claim that the benefits arise 
mostly from the provision of better incentives. If this is the case, it is necessary to find the 
best way to provide incentives to teachers so that they engender long-lasting improvements in 
student learning. It is possible that this could be achieved through contract teachers or by 
other pay for performance schemes. This should be further investigated. Those benefits from 
better incentives could then be extended to civil service teachers, for example, by teacher 
union agreements to reform the tenure of the teachers to depend on performance.  
As mentioned above, another aspect of education management that is involved in 
contract teacher interventions is decentralization. While civil servant teachers are hired 
centrally – and they are supervised, promoted, and transferred in the same way – it is a local 
committee that is in charge of the contract teachers’ appointments. It may be that contract 
teachers outperform tenured ones because of a better selection by the local committees, or 
because they are more aware of the needs of students living in their communities they can 
better target the needs of these children. If this is the case, decentralization of hiring and/or 
supervision could be enough to improve the performance of civil service teachers. In fact, 
Duflo et al. (2007) show that in the schools that had empowered committees to monitor 
teachers, civil service teachers were more likely to be in class and teaching during random 
visits, and their students performed better than in schools with unmonitored civil service 
teachers. 
From the point of view of both researchers and policy-makers, the biggest 
identification challenge that contract teacher programs face for future research is to 
understand why contract teachers perform better. It is important to notice that if these 
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programs are to be scaled-up we should also consider whether there would be equilibrium 
effects in terms of the subsequent distribution of teacher skills.  
Most obvious of all, improved evidence about these topics is crucial to assess the 
external validity of contract teacher interventions. For example, the cost-effectiveness of a 
contract teacher policy is likely to depend on country characteristics and the level of 
education involved. The experimental studies mentioned above involve contract teachers only 
at the primary level, where the supply of potential teachers with minimum capacity is not as 
likely to be constrained as at the secondary level (Bruns et al., 2011). Also, cost-benefit 
evaluations will not only allow us to see whether contract teachers are preferable to regular 
teachers, but also to compare contract teachers to other related interventions (see Chapter 8 in 
this volume about cost-effectiveness of educational programs).  
 
VI. Complementary Interventions 
When we evaluate public policies – or social programs of any kind – we usually 
consider the effects of the program on the welfare of the affected population; this is the 
Welfare Criteria (Kaplow and Shavell, 2002).  An intervention that improves the welfare of at 
least one individual without making anyone worse-off is considered desirable; this is the 
Pareto Criteria. However, most policies cannot be ordered according to the Pareto Criteria. In 
democratic states, the preferences of the society as a whole should be taken into account to 
adopt reforms. This suggests that it is convenient to have a “social welfare function” through 
which the different alternative policies could be compared. In spite of this, a traditional result 
in welfare economics shows the impossibility of aggregating preferences of diverse agents in 
an acceptable way (Arrow, 1951).  
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Leaving this difficulty aside, we may act as if there exists a “correct” way to represent 
the preferences of the society. In the literature, different welfare functions have been 
postulated, implying diverse trade-offs between the efficiency and equity objectives. 
Obviously, these issues are subjective, and thus controversial. Nevertheless, policy-makers 
must make policy choices continuously due to budget constraints or to cases where the 
alternatives are mutually exclusive. As far as the choice of policies is concerned, if we do not 
consider distributional issues in principle, cost-effectiveness analysis is the best criterion 
available. In spite of this, distributional conflicts are always present when deciding public 
policy interventions.  
These considerations about welfare functions and the efficiency/equity trade-offs 
could be important in deciding whether a reform should be adopted. In the previous sections 
we reviewed different School Management interventions. Indeed, not only did we study the 
average effect of interventions, but also – when evidence was available – we analyzed their 
potential distributional effects. In the case of contract teachers there is little evidence about 
how heterogeneous the effects are, although some papers do report such interventions to be 
especially beneficial for the lowest-achieving students.33 Instead, in the case of teacher 
incentives, the evidence seems to go in the opposite direction, suggesting that the most able 
students tend to gain more from it. Even though decentralization seems to have average 
positive effects, the poor do not always benefit from this type of reform, and could even be 
harmed. Regarding tracking, the results are more heterogeneous: most non-experimental 
empirical studies report that tracking hurts the least-performing students, while the sole 
experimental study finds benefits for students at all skill levels. 
                                                 
33 See Banerjee et al., 2008; Bourdon et al., 2007. 
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When policies that are on average beneficial engender distributional effects, the 
efficiency equity trade-off that we mentioned above is usually crucial.34 Let’s consider the 
following highly-stylized model.  Assume that there are only two groups, rich and poor, in 
equal proportions, denoted by subscripts r and p, respectively. There is one function mapping 
the common educational policy  EEE ,  to the incomes of the rich, )(EYr , and the incomes 
of the poor, )(EYp . The typical efficiency-equity trade-off can be represented by a situation 
such as an increase in E  produces a growth in average income, )(
2
1
)(
2
1
EYEY pr  , but at the 
same time diminishes )(EYp . Suppose there is a redistributive mechanism that can be used to 
transfer an amount T  from rich to poor individuals. Of the income taken from the rich an 
amount  TC  is lost, where the (increasing and convex) function  C  represents the typical 
problems associated with distortive redistribution that are widely studied in Public 
Economics (e.g. moral hazard, distortion of relative prices, etc.). Let  U  be the usual 
indirect utility function, strictly increasing and concave. The problem for the utilitarian 
government is: 
  
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After combining the FOCs for an interior solution, we get: 
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On the left side, we have the ratio of marginal returns from education for the rich and 
the poor while on the right side we have the marginal cost from redistribution. Therefore, a 
                                                 
34 Although in some cases redistribution is actually found to be efficient (Mookherjee, 2006), this trade-off is a 
commonplace in the models of economists and policy-makers. 
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benevolent utilitarian government should use the marginal cost from redistribution as a rule 
to think about the equity-efficiency trade-off. In the developing world this marginal cost is 
usually high – certainly higher than in the developed world - due to a variety of well-
documented problems: widespread corruption, large informal sector, fiscal evasion, lack of 
trust, etc. (see, for example, Olken, 2006). This would imply that the optimal educational 
policies in the developing world should be relatively more oriented towards equity than in the 
developed world. 
However, instead of dismissing interventions due to inequity concerns, the policy-
maker could exploit complementary interventions to improve the situation of those that are 
harmed by the policy (i.e., seek a second instrument to achieve this desirable second goal). 
For example, in the case of complementary interventions to apply together with 
decentralization, we should think of how the educational performance of the poor could 
improve. According to the literature, a key point to consider is that even the best school 
policies may have little or no effect when students and parents fail to respond with the right 
actions (see, for example, the model in Section III). A combination of lack of information and 
inaccurate expectations can leave the poor trapped in poverty, given that they are unable to 
adopt actions that would improve their living standards considerably (e.g. Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2011). 
First, poor households may not have information about their potential returns from 
education. Thus, providing students/families with information – which is a relatively 
inexpensive policy – may push individuals towards better choices about human capital 
investment. Indeed, Jensen (2010) provided a random subset of schools with information on 
the returns to schooling (estimated from earnings data). Relative to those not provided with 
information, these students reported dramatically increased perceived returns when re-
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interviewed four to six months later, and on average completed 0.20 more years of schooling 
over the next four years. Nguyen (2008) also presents experimental data, in this case from 
Madagascar, which shows that informing fourth-grade students and their parents about the 
returns to schooling increased average daily attendance by 3.5 percentage points and test 
scores by 0.20 standard deviations after three months. And Dinkelman and Martinez (2011) 
show that giving/showing a DVD with information to high-school students in Chile increased 
attendance and willingness to finance future education with government loans. Perhaps if 
parents and students from poor households upgrade their perceived returns to schooling with 
this complementary intervention, then they will better exploit the advantages of school 
management reforms (for example, by attending parent meetings). 
Second, parents in poorer areas might not have information about their rights, how to 
demand that they be respected, and how to help the school to improve their children’s 
education. This problem is particularly important in the context of school decentralization. In 
the context of the model presented in Section III, the value of ij , which represents the 
efficiency of community ij ’s effort, may need to be raised. The experimental evidence shows 
that there is scope for improvements of this type. Banerjee et al. (2008) study the Village 
Education Committees (VECs) program in India, which was supposed to monitor the 
performance of the schools, report problems to higher authorities, hire and fire community-
based teachers, and use additional resources for school improvement from a national 
education program.35 Their experiments to increase participation show that citizens face 
                                                 
35 Three different treatments were randomized. The results from the third treatment were already discussed in 
the section on contract teachers. In the first treatment, the NGO organized meetings in the villages, where school 
staff and village local government representatives were encouraged to share information about the structure and 
organization of local service delivery, including the role and activities of the VECs. The second treatment 
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substantial constraints in getting involved with the improvement of the public education 
system, even when they care about education and are willing to do something to improve it.36 
However, when parents are able to overcome the barriers to be involved and are also 
empowered, having trained school committees may prove to be a good intervention for 
improving students’ performance.37 Also, Gertler et al. (2011) study a very inexpensive 
program in Mexico that involves parents directly managing schools located in disadvantaged 
rural communities.38 They find that empowering parents reduces failure and repetition rates 
significantly. However, while the program was effective in poor communities, it had no effect 
in extremely poor communities. 
A more direct strategy to provide parents with incentives to enroll their children in 
school is Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, which have been implemented in many 
developing countries. CCT programs provide cash transfers to finance current consumption 
subject to the “attainment” of certain conditions that foster human capital investments. A 
detailed review of CCT programs is provided by Behrman et al. in Chapter 5 of this volume 
                                                                                                                                                        
included the activities described in the first treatment, but the NGO members also demonstrated the process of 
creating “learning report cards” by conducting simple assessments of reading and arithmetic with the local 
children. The goal behind the design of the second intervention was that community members and parents 
become sensitized to their children’s educational progress. 
36 An average village of about 360 households sent about 100 people to the meetings, yet both the first and 
second interventions had no impact on community involvement in public schools, and no impact on teacher 
effort or student learning outcomes in those schools. 
37 This is similar to one of the treatments in India’s “Extra Teacher Program”; see Duflo et al., forthcoming 
38 The program finances parent associations and motivates parental participation by involving them in the 
management of primary school grants. They found that the program reduced grade failure by 7.4 percent and 
grade repetition by 5.5 percent in grades 1 through 3, although it had no effect on dropout rates. 
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and also in Galiani (2008). CCT programs have had significant positive impacts on a wide 
range of outcomes, including educational outcomes.39 In the context of CCTs as a 
complementary intervention, they seem to have a positive effect on equality: the impact on 
enrollment rates are generally larger for those groups that have lower base-line enrollment 
rates, lower transition rates from primary to secondary school, girls, or poorer households 
(Galiani and McEwan, 2011). Also, some potential complementary interventions invovle 
giving resources to the poor to complement other interventions that do not benefit them 
directly. Chapter 2 in this volume covers some examples (see also Glewwe et al, 2009). 
Overall, we think that it is more likely that poor communities adopt complementary 
interventions that are related to accountability and empowerment or giving incentives to 
parents rather than those involving an increase in their spending on education.  
In summary, we conclude that there is an interesting menu of complementary 
interventions that could be combined with the school management policies analyzed before in 
ways that would enhance their positive results and reduce inequality in education outcomes. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
In this survey, we have analyzed three types of School Management interventions: 
school decentralization, student tracking, and teacher incentives. We cover a non-exhaustive 
list of empirical papers that exploit non-experimental, quasi-experimental and experimental 
identification strategies. 
In our opinion, for each case, a deeper understanding of their structural mechanisms at 
work is a key goal for future research in this area. Given the heterogeneous effects of these 
                                                 
39 For a very complete review see Fiszbein et al. (2009). 
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policies, knowing the channels through which they operate differentially across sub-
populations or settings is of high priority. This understanding will aid in designing 
complementary cost-effective interventions that enhance the effects of the reforms or help to 
extend its benefits to those that have not been reached.  
Overall, we have drawn several conclusions regarding the interventions surveyed, and 
more importantly, we have raised related topics that require further exploration. Our main 
findings are that decentralization programs seem to be successful in increasing the average 
performance of students. However, the better-off communities or schools tend to profit most 
from this type of intervention, which increases inequality. A goal for future studies would be 
to understand how school autonomy differentially affects relatively poor and rich 
communities. Complementary interventions could then be implemented to compensate those 
that do not gain from decentralization; giving information to promote parental participation 
through school committees seems to be effective, especially in poorer communities where the 
decentralized resources are more likely to be diverted to other needs that do not necessarily 
raise welfare.  
Regarding tracking, the experimental evidence suggests that tracking increases the 
performance of students across all skill levels. However, because there is only one 
experimental study, and especially because it contrasts with the non-experimental evidence, 
further experimental evidence is needed. Finally, most of the teacher incentive schemes 
studied proved to have positive results in terms of reducing absenteeism of teachers and 
improving the performance of students, although the compensations systems should be 
designed to discourage teaching to the test. Concerning contract teachers, the empirical 
evidence also shows favorable impacts on students’ test scores and teachers’ absenteeism. 
However, understanding whether this happens because of incentives, decentralization of 
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hiring, or through other channels is key to designing better contracts for tenured civil service 
teachers and profiting most from the combination of the two types of teachers. Also, 
complementary interventions regarding monitoring of teachers by parental committees or 
extra hiring of contract teachers to help more disadvantaged students could be useful to 
increase the average and distributional benefits from this type of intervention. 
Finally, school management reforms should be accompanied by programs aimed at 
stimulating the demand for education of those individuals who are less likely to take 
advantage of the reforms. This combination of demand and supply interventions seems to be 
an attractive recipe for promoting and raising education outcomes, which, in turn, will 
promote long run economic growth in the developing world. 
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Table 1 (School decentralization) 
Name Methodology Place/Date Population 
Dependant 
Variable 
Independent Variable / 
Reform / Treatment 
Results 
Galiani, Gertler 
and 
Schargrodsky 
(2008)  
Panel of 
schools; 
Differences-in-
differences 
(DiD) 
Argentina, 
1994-1999 
Fifth-year 
secondary 
students 
Standardized Math 
and Spanish test 
scores 
Central government 
transferred all its secondary 
schools to provincial control. 
Decentralization had an overall positive effect on student test scores: 
math test scores increased 3.5%** 
and Spanish tests rose 5.4%** on average after 5 years of decentralized 
administration.. However, decentralization had no significant impact on 
poor municipalities. 
Madeira (2007) 
Panel of 
schools; DiD  
Brazil, 1996-
2003 
All public 
primary 
school 
students in the 
state of São 
Paulo 
Dropout, failure, 
enrollment rates 
and school 
resources 
Sao Paulo State Education 
Reform 
On average, one year of decentralization increases dropouts by 
0.6s.d.**, failure rates by 1s.d.** and increased VCRs and TVs per 
hundred students by 0.1s.d.**. One year of decentralization increased 
enrollment by 0.2s.d. on average.  The results are partially driven by 
the democratization of the school access. Effects where more perverse 
in rural and poor areas, widening the gap between good and bad 
schools. 
Salinas Pena 
and Sole Olle 
(2009) 
Panel of 
provinces; DiD 
Spain, 1987-
2005 
16 year old 
students, 
passing from 
compulsory to 
non-
compulsory 
education 
Survival rate as a 
measure of 
educational 
attainment 
Spanish decentralization 
period. Dummy variable for 
decentralized provinces 
Decentralization had a positive effect on enrollment in non-vocational 
training programs at the expenses of vocational training programs, 
which might reflect a better match between population preferences and 
educational policies. The effect on survival rate is more than 1.6%** 
percent on average, but it appears to be positively correlated with per 
capita income of the region 
Paes de Barros 
and Mendoca 
(1998) 
Panel of states; 
DiD  
Brazil, 1981-
1993 
Primary 
school 
students 
Repetition and 
dropout rates, 
standardized test 
scores 
Dummies for intervention, 
using the different timing of 
the interventions across 
states 
Decrease on repetition rate (-2.4*** points); no impact on test scores 
Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999) 
Cross section of 
students; IV for 
EDUCO school 
El Salvador, 
1996 
Third grade 
students 
Standardized math 
and language test 
scores and student 
absenteeism  
EDUCO program. 
Decentralization improved students’ language skills (0.43s.d. † ) and 
diminished student absences (by around 3.5*) 
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Jimenez and 
Sawada  
(2003) 
School-level 
panel data; 
Heckman 
correction 
model 
El Salvador 
1996-2003 
3rd grade 
students in 
rural schools 
Retention and 
repetition rates 
EDUCO program.  
Students in EDUCO schools are 0.36** more likely to continue in 
school after 2 years. 
King and Özler 
(1998) 
Matching 
schools that 
participated and 
did not 
participate in the 
reform; IV for 
de facto 
autonomy 
Nicaragua, 
1995-1997 
Both primary 
and secondary 
school 
students 
School enrollment 
rates, levels of 
student grade 
repetition and 
dropouts, math and 
language test 
A governmental program 
transferred key management 
tasks from central authorities 
to school councils.  
Autonomy de jure does not affect student’s performance. Higher de 
facto autonomy in some administrative decisions, spatially in the 
ability to hire and fire school personnel, is correlated with a better 
student’s achievement. A one standard deviation increase in the 
number of decisions made by school council at the primary level is 
associated with an increase of 6.73%** in math test score, or 4.05%** 
in for Spanish test score in secondary schools.  
Faguet and 
Sanchez (2008) 
Panel of states; 
Before-after 
estimator 
Bolivia, 1991-
1996, and  
Colombia, 
1993-2004 
Primary and 
secondary 
school 
students. All 
Bolivian 
municipalities 
and 85% of 
Colombian 
municipalities 
Expenditure and 
investment by 
sectors.  
Dummy for the years after 
the reform has taken place 
In Colombia: increase in student enrollment in public schools (by 
0.1***)  
In Bolivia: change in investment patterns of local governments, making 
them more responsive to local needs 
Benveniste and 
Marshall 
(2004) 
Randomization 
by district 
Cambodia, 
1999-2003 
Primary 
school 
students 
Dropout and pass 
rates, standardized 
test scores 
Treated schools received a 
grant that was invested in 
priorities determined by 
local stakeholders, as well as 
technical advisors to help 
planning and implementation 
activities 
Increase pass rates (4.2%*** and 4.3%*** after two and three years of 
the program), lowered dropout (1.1%*** and 1.2%*** after two and 
three years of the program, respectively), improved achievement (0.13* 
standard deviations) 
*, ** and *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; † = not significant at 10% level 
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Table 2 (Tracking) 
Name Methodology Place/Date Population 
Dependant 
Variable 
Independent Variable / Reform / 
Treatment 
Results 
Duflo, Dupas and 
Kremer (2011) 
Randomized Trial 
Kenya, 2005-
2007 
Grade 1 students 
Standardized math 
and language test 
scores 
121 primary schools received funds 
to hire an extra contract teacher and 
split the class into two sections. In 
60 randomly selected schools, 
students were randomly assign to 
each class, while in the other 61 
they were ranked by prior 
achievement 
Tracking had positive effects on all students. Students in tracking 
schools have on average 0.14* s.d. higher test scores than those in 
non-tracking schools (0.16** one year after the experiment 
finished).  
Betts and Shkolnik 
(2000) 
Panel of students; 
using test scores 
before some schools 
began to track 
USA, 1987-
1992 
Students at grades 
7 to 12 
Standardized math 
tests 
Dummy for tracking schools 
High ability students are benefited from tracking while low ability 
students are not benefited not hurt.  
Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2005) 
Panel of countries; 
difference in 
difference 
18-26 
countries, 
1995-2003 
4th to 8th grade 
students 
Standardized 
international tests 
in reading, 
mathematics and 
science 
Dummy if the student attends to a 
school in a system that tracks in that 
grade 
Early tracking increases educational inequality: it can account for 
one quarter of the difference in inequality between the most 
equitable and the most inequitable country. There is also some 
evidence that early tracking reduce mean performance. 
Burke and Sass 
(2008) 
Panel of students; 
student and teacher 
fixed effects 
Florida, USA, 
1999-2004 
Students at grades 
3 to 10 
Standardized 
reading and math 
test scores 
Average fixed effects of classroom 
peers 
 Teacher and peer quality is correlated, resulting in possible bias 
on previous studies that omitted teacher variables. Low achieving 
students experience a 0.82 point boost to their math score from 1 
point increase in the mean peer's score, whereas high ability 
students will receive 0.1** point increase under de same 
treatment. Strong positive effect for the lower achieving students 
from having peers from the higher quartile of the distribution, but 
the opposite happens for high achieving students with poor 
quality peers. 
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Figlio and Page 
(2002) 
Panel of students in 
Tracking and Non-
Tracking schools; 
Difference in 
Difference, IV for 
tracking status 
USA, 1987-
1994 
8th to 10th grade 
students 
Change from 8th to 
10th grade in 
student's IRT math 
score 
Instrument tracking status of the 
school and track of the student 
(reported by the principal of the 
school) with the number of courses 
required for state graduation, the 
number of schools in the county, 
and the fraction of voters in the 
county who voted for President 
Reagan 
No evidence that tracking hurts low-ability children. 
Hoffer (1992) 
Cross section of 
schools; propensity 
score matching 
USA, 1987-
1989 
7th graders and 
10th graders 
Math and science 
standardized test 
scores 
Dummy variables indicating if a 
student is placed in an 
heterogeneous group, or in a  high, 
middle, or low ability group 
There is evidence of a positive effect of tracking for high ability 
students (0.08** and 0.24 standard deviations in science and 
mathematics, respectively) and a negative effect for low ability 
students (around 0.3** and 0.34** standard deviations), summing 
up to a negative average effect. 
Argys, Rees and 
Brewer (1996) 
Cross section of 
students, OLS  with a 
selectivity correction 
term 
USA, 1988 
10th grade students 
in public schools 
Standardized math 
test scores 
Dummy variables indicating if a 
student is placed in an 
heterogeneous group, or in a  high, 
middle, or low ability group 
Differential effect of tracking, helping students in high ability 
tracks and students in average ability tracks (5%** and 2%** 
gain in math test score, respectively) on the expenses of students 
in low ability tracks (5%** lose). They find a small positive net 
effect, suggesting an overall efficiency gain 
*, ** and *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; † = not significant at 10% level 
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Table 3 (Teacher Incentives) 
Name Methodology Place/Date Population Dependant Variable Independent Variable / Reform / Treatment Results 
Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman 
(2011) 
Randomized trial 
India 
2005-2007 
Primary 
school 
teacher  
Standardized math and 
language test scores  
The program provided bonus payments to teachers 
based either on the average improvement in test scores 
of all school students (group incentives) or on the 
average improvement of their own students.  
Students in treated schools perform 0.27*** and 
0.17*** standard deviations better in math and 
language test, respectively. The average bonus was 
3% of annual pay. Incentive schools also perform 
significantly better than other schools that received 
additional schooling inputs of a similar value 
Glewwe, Kremer 
and Ilias (2010) 
Randomized trial 
Kenya 
1998-1999 
Primary 
school 
teacher 
Teacher attendance, 
homework assignment, 
pedagogy, test preparation 
sessions and student test 
scores on district exams 
The program offered schools the opportunity to provide 
gifts to teachers if students performed well. It provided 
prizes to teachers in grades 4 to 8 based on the 
performance of the school as a whole on the district 
exams in each year. Prizes ranged from 21 to 43% of 
typical teacher monthly salaries. 
Students in schools with a teacher incentive program 
were significantly more likely to take exams and had 
higher test scores in the short run. Teachers in 
program schools had no higher attendance rates or 
homework 
assignment rates. Pedagogy and student dropout 
rates were similar across schools. Teachers in 
program schools increased test preparation activities 
and encouraged students enrolled in school to take 
the test. 
Duflo Hanna and 
Ryan 
(2010) 
Randomized trial 
and structural 
model 
India, 2003-
2004 
Rural school 
students 
Teacher absenteeism, and 
students test scores 
In 60 randomly chose schools out of 120,  the teacher 
received a camera with a tramper-proof date and time 
function. Teachers were instructed to make on of the 
students take a photograph of the teacher and other 
students at the start and end of each school day. Each 
teacher was then paid according to the days worked 
Teachers' absenteeism fell by 21*** percentage 
points, and student's test scores increased by 
0.17*** standard deviations 
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Contract Teachers 
Duflo, Dupas and 
Kremer (2009) 
Randomized trial 
Kenya, 2005-
2007 
First grade 
students 
Student test scores, 
teacher absenteeism 
and time spent actively 
teaching, student 
attendance 
70 schools out of 140 were 
randomly selected to receive a 
treatment, consisting on hiring an 
extra contract teacher to split the 
class in two, and randomly divide 
the students to each class 
Students randomly assigned to contract teachers score 0.23** s.d. 
higher and an 11% increase in grade promotion than their 
schoolmates assigned to civil service teachers. Contract teachers 
30 p.p. more likely to be found in class teaching than civil servant 
teachers. This effect persist in the long run in schools where local 
communities where trained on how to monitor contract teachers. 
These schools tend to keep contract teachers after the program has 
ended. 
Barnerjee, Banerji, 
Duflo, Glennerster 
and Khemani (2008) 
Randomized trial 
India, 2005-
2006 
Primary school 
children 
Reading and math test 
NGOs trained volunteers to teach 
children to read and organized 
remedial reading camps (outside 
the school) 
Treatment had positive impact on learning: the average child who 
could not read anything and attended the camp was 60%** points 
more likely to decipher letters after a year than a comparable child 
in a control village 
Banerjee, Cole, 
Dulfo and Linden 
(2007) 
Randomized trial 
India, 2001-
2003 
Disadvantage 
students at 
grades 3 and 4 
Student test scores, 
teacher absenteeism 
The program hired young women 
to teach students lagging behind 
in treated schools. 
The effect was positive for all children and higher for those at the 
bottom third of the distribution than at for those at the top third 
(0.47*** standard deviations versus 0.23*** standard deviations) 
Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman 
(2010) 
Randomized trial 
India, 2005-
2007 
Students at 
grades 1 to 5 
Standardized math and 
language test scores, 
absenteeism rates 
100 randomly-chosen 
government-run rural schools 
were provided with contract 
teachers 
Students in schools with an extra contract teacher perform better 
by 0.15*** in math's and 0.9*** in language standard deviations. 
Contract teachers were also 9% *** less likely to be absent than 
civil servant teachers 
Burde and Linden 
(2010) 
Randomized Trial 
Afghanistan, 
2007-2008 
Primary school 
students 
Enrollment rate. 
Standardized math and 
language test scores 
In randomly selected villages, the 
program  provides educational 
material and training for locally-
recruited educated individuals to 
serve as teachers in village-based 
schools 
Village-based schools improved children performance. School 
enrollment increased by 42 %*** and test scores by 1.2*** s.d.. 
The effect on enrollment where stronger for girls than for boys, 
thus alleviating the gender gap in enrollment. 
Bourdon, Frolich y 
Michaelowa 
(2006) 
Cross section of 
students; 
Propensity score 
matching 
Niger, 2000-
2001 
Students in the 
2nd and 5th 
grade 
Standardized math and 
French test scores 
Dummy for contract teachers 
Contract teachers have enable Niger to enhance enrolment, 
although there is some evidence of deteriorated education for 
contract teacher students in the 2nd grade(-5,43* points in math 
French test scores), the difference is small and not significant at a 
10% level for 5th grade students 
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Bourdon, Frolich y 
Michaelowa 
(2007) 
Cross section of 
students; Non-
parametric 
matching 
estimator 
Mali, 
2001/2002;  
Niger and Togo, 
2000/2001 
2nd and 5th 
grade students 
Standardized math and 
French test scores 
Dummy for contract teachers 
Contract teachers programs appear to have better impact for low 
achieving students than high achieving students: in Mali, students 
in the bottom of the ability distribution assign to contract teachers 
perform 14** to 33*** p.p. higher than those assigned to civil 
servant teachers, while there is no significant difference for high 
ability students. In Niger high ability students with contract 
teachers score between 19 and 25 (** to ***) p.p. lower while 
coefficients are not significant for low ability students. Overall, 
they had a positive impact when applied in a more decentralized 
way (in Mali) and a negative impact in centralized cases (in Niger), 
probably because of better monitoring from local communities. 
Alcazar, Chaudhury, 
Hammer, Kremer, 
Muralidharan and 
Rogers 
(2006) 
Cross section of 
teachers; 
Matching 
estimates 
Peru, 2002 
Primary school 
teachers 
Absence rates, 
measure with 
unannounced visits 
Dummy for contract teachers Contract teachers 12-13%*** more likely to be absent 
Goyal and Pandey 
(2009) 
Cross section of 
students; 
Propensity score 
matching 
Madhya 
Pradesh, India, 
2006 
Teachers in 
grades 1 to 5 
Test scores, teacher 
attendance and activity 
Dummy for contract teachers 
Contract teachers absent 27% of the time and found teaching 37% 
of the time, while regular teachers absent 37% of the time and 
found teaching 25% of the time. These results worsen for contract 
teachers in second contract year but where still better than regular 
teachers. Difference in absenteeism and activity significant at 5% 
and 1% level, respectively 
*, ** and *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; † = not significant at 10% level 
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Appendix A – solution to the decentralized problem. 
In the decentralized case, given the government education effort ijb , the problem for community 
ij is: 
 
  ijijijijij
a
abaMax
ij
  
1
)ˆ()(  
The first order condition for an interior solution is: 
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Since there are no economies of scale, we can study the problem of the government in each 
particular community ij separately: 
 
  2
1
)()ˆ())(( ijij
d
ijijijij
d
ijijij
b
bbabbaMax
ij






    
This objective function may differ in cases where the educational spending is financed in a way 
that may distort incentives.40 After substituting for dija , the objective function becomes:  
 
2
1
11ˆ ijijijijij
b
bbMax
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

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The first order condition for an interior solution yields: 
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
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ijijd
ijb . 
                                                 
40 For example, Kenya has a mixed educational system in which local communities are allowed to build their 
schools and should pay non-teachers expenditures, whereas the central government is in charge of assigning teachers 
to schools and paying their salaries (as well as setting the curriculum and administering national tests). This 
obviously introduces distortions: Kremer et al (2003) show that this system generates local communities with too 
many small schools, rather than fewer, larger schools, and where reallocating expenditures from teachers to non-
teacher inputs and reducing the cost of education could improve welfare. 
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Finally, evaluating )( ij
d
ij ba  at 
d
ijb we obtain: 
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And evaluating ),( ijijij bae  at 
d
ijb  and )(
d
ij
d
ij ba  we get the educational outcome: 
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